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This thesis is a collection of three essays in behavioural economics. The first paper considers
one of the most well-known cognitive biases (the “sunk cost effect”). Given its notoriety, it is
perhaps somewhat surprising that there has not been many lab-based experiments that try to
measure the effect. In our design we find evidence of a significant sunk cost effect (23% of
the sample were subject to it) and are able to trace its determinants back to a particular aspect
of intelligence (“cognitive reflection”). Moreover, we use our found sunk cost behaviour to
validate a new off-the-shelf scale (the “SCE-8”) for researchers to use.
The second paper then considers how a particular type of mental training (“mindfulness med-
itation”) can alleviate a different type of cognitive bias (“information avoidance”). Reporting
evidence from a randomised-controlled trial we find that a short mindfulness treatment (two
weeks, 15-minutes a day) is able to significantly reduce information avoidance in comparison
to the control group. Since anyone in the population can vary in their levels of mindfulness
(even if they have never meditated), these results potentially have a wide relevance. Possible
mechanisms and policy implications are discussed.
Finally, the third paper takes a step back from individual cognitive biases to investigate a novel
way of measuring wellbeing at the macro (national) level. It asks whether the emotions of
a country’s most popular songs potentially carries a signal of how happy people are actually
feeling in the population. Applying emotion-detecting machine learning algorithms to the UK’s
chart music, we find that the valence of the most popular song of the year can reliably predict
how happy people are (with respect to the leading survey-based measure of life satisfaction).
iv
Evaluating the Sunk Cost Effect*
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Abstract
We provide experimental evidence of behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect. Sub-
jects who earned a lottery via a real-effort task were given an opportunity to switch to a
dominant lottery; 23% chose to stick with their dominated lottery. The endowment effect
accounts for roughly only one third of the effect. Subjects’ capacity for cognitive reflec-
tion is a significant determinant of sunk cost behavior. We also find stocks of knowledge
or experience (crystallized intelligence) predict sunk cost behavior, rather than algorithmic
thinking (fluid intelligence) or the personality trait of openness. We construct and validate
a scale, the “SCE-8”, which encompasses many resources individuals can spend, and offers
researchers an efficient way to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. JEL: D91,
C83, C90
Keywords: sunk cost effect, sunk cost fallacy, endowment effect, cognitive ability, fluid in-
telligence, crystallized intelligence, reflective thinking, randomized controlled trial, online ex-
periment, online survey, psychological scales, scale validation, Raven’s progressive matrices,
international cognitive ability resource, cognitive reflection test, openness.
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“No matter how far you’ve gone down the wrong road, turn back.”
- Turkish proverb
1 Introduction
In a famous example by Thaler (1980), an individual who purchased a $40 ticket to a basketball
game finds themselves driving for miles through a snowstorm, just because they feel it would
be wasteful to ignore the initial investment. A seminal definition of this “sunk cost fallacy” or
“sunk cost effect” by Arkes and Blumer (1985) characterizes individuals as falling prey to the
effect when they continue an endeavor as a result of previously invested resources such as time,
money, or effort. Many definitions have been offered, but central to them all is the idea that
some actions (sunk) in the past constrain decision-making in the present despite the fact that
the actions do not affect the attractiveness of the available options. The effect seems ubiquitous,
with work showing that it is even present in mice and rats (Sweis et al., 2018). It is also an
important part of the work by Thaler (1999) on mental accounting, which is based on the idea
that individuals often fail to treat money as a fully fungible resource. We offer contributions to
the identification, understanding, and measurement of the sunk cost effect in humans.
First, we conduct an experiment with pecuniary incentives to detect behavior consistent with the
sunk cost effect in a controlled setting. Subjects in the primary treatment completed a real-effort
task to earn a lottery. Subjects who earned the lottery (n = 268) then had the (unanticipated)
choice to switch to a dominant lottery; 23% chose to stick with their earned (and dominated)
lottery. We argue that the endowment effect is an intrinsic part of the sunk cost effect. To
uncover how large a part, we ran a second treatment in which subjects (n = 197) did not face
the effort task, but were instead endowed with the inferior lottery before having the choice to
switch to the superior lottery; 7% chose to stick with their endowed (and dominated) lottery.
Second, we document correlations between sunk cost behavior and different traits that have been
argued to be related to the effect, which we pre-registered in advance.1 One type of cognitive
ability introduced by Frederick (2005), “cognitive reflection”, concerns the ability of an indi-
vidual to override a heuristically-primed (“System 1”) response and engage in further deliberate
(“System 2”) reflection to figure out the correct answer, and has been found to be predictive of
various types of biases (Toplak et al., 2011).2 We test its capacity to explain our behavioral
measure of the sunk cost effect and find it to be a highly significant predictor. Because cogni-
tive reflection is itself likely to be a function of different aspects of intelligence and thinking
style (Stanovich and West, 2008) we also test three of these measures and find crystallized
intelligence to be a significant driver.
1In our pre-trial registration (https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4083-2.0) we listed a small number of variables
linked to cognitive ability, which have been argued to be related to the sunk-cost effect. We did this both to test the
associations posited in the literature, and to limit our ability to find and exploit spurious correlations.
2Terms “System 1” and “System 2” are those famously used by Kahneman (2011).
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Third, we validate a scale comprised of hypothetical scenarios to measure individuals’ suscep-
tibility to the sunk cost effect. Using factor analysis, we refine the scale down from 18 to 8
scenarios; the SCE-8. We find that our SCE-8 measure emulates the behavioral measure gen-
erated by our experiment well. This suggests the SCE-8 may adequately measure subjects’
susceptibility to the sunk cost effect in lieu of a behavioral measure. As such, we offer our scale
as a simpler and more cost-effective way to capture subjects’ susceptibility to the effect.
Fourth, to reflect the wide-ranging nature of the effect we include multiple types of sunk re-
sources including effort, time, money and emotional attachment. Effort and time are perhaps
the most relevant costs in our experiment, but all four are represented in the SCE-8. Our results
indicate that many different sunk resources contribute to a singular, underlying sunk cost effect.
We also provide a definition of the sunk cost effect and contrast it with the endowment effect.
Given the tight structure of our definition it is also possible to distinguish between the sunk cost
effect and the sunk cost fallacy, which until now many have used interchangeably.
2 Literature
Many papers report evidence of behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect. These studies
typically rely on responses to hypothetical questions, are subject to various confounds, or are
field experiments that tend to suffer from real-world factors that complicate the interpretation
of the effect. For example, it can be hard to disentangle the sunk cost effect from other pos-
sible reasons for behavior in real world situations involving price data (Ashraf et al., 2010;
Berry et al., 2020; Cohen et al., 2015), while consumer goods may be subject to heterogeneous
mental accounting (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Just and Wansink, 2011), and penny auctions can
suffer from intractable bidding environments (Augenblick, 2016). In contrast, lab and online
experiments offer greater control and cleaner measurement; attractive merits for our purposes.
Some experiments have attempted to identify the sunk cost effect. Friedman et al. (2007) find
limited evidence of the effect, but with a design that does not give subjects a choice between
actions, an important factor in generating the effect (Staw, 1976). The design of Weigel (2018)
features choice but employs a penny auction task, the dynamic nature of which raises the need
to control for confounds such as the gambler’s fallacy.3 In contrast, we conduct an experiment
with a simple structure in which subjects sink resources then make a one-off decision.
Several papers have tested the role of cognition in accounting for sunk cost behavior.4 Evidence
has been mixed, with often a small or insignificant correlation found between intelligence mea-
sures and sunk costs. However, the majority of studies measure sunk cost behavior using un-
validated hypothetical scenarios e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007); Larrick et al. (1993); Parker
3The lab experiment of Haita-Falah (2017) is a second design allowing for choice, but the task and instructions are
complex and there is evidence subjects may not understand the task (see e.g., Weigel, 2018, footnote 3).
4A more general drive in economics has examined the relationship of cognitive ability to other important charac-
teristics e.g., temporal and risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2010) and cooperation (Proto et al., 2019).
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and Fischhoff (2005); Stanovich and West (2008); Strough et al. (2008); Toplak et al. (2011).
We incentivize subjects to sink resources via a real-effort task and find evidence that cognitive
reflection and crystallized intelligence measures significantly explain the variation in our data.
Early in the study of the sunk cost effect, there were discussions of the extent to which non-
monetary resources might be fungible. For instance, Thaler (1999) briefly discusses how people
appear to allocate time sub-optimally, while Soman (2001) argues people treat sunk time and
sunk money differently. However, there have been almost no attempts within the literature to
explore the commensurability of time, effort, money or emotional attachment as separate factors
in a sunk cost problem. This might be considered important especially if these concepts cannot
be converted readily into monetary values (Leclerc et al., 1995). We include different resources
in our scale (time, money, effort, and emotion) and find them all to be relevant in describing a
single underlying factor: susceptibility to the sunk cost effect.
When considering the role of cognition in explaining behavioral biases, it is important to distin-
guish between different measures. Cognitive reflection is a type of cognitive ability introduced
by Frederick (2005) relating to the ability to override a heuristically-primed or knee-jerk re-
sponse and engage in further reflection to figure out a correct answer, and has been found to
predict various types of bias (Toplak et al., 2011). We test its potential to explain the sunk
cost effect using our behavioral and scale measures, and find it highly predictive of both. An
individual’s cognitive reflection, in turn, is likely dependent on other aspects of intelligence
and thinking style (Stanovich and West, 2008; Stanovich, 2012). In particular, accumulated
stocks of knowledge and experience that might help one to recognize the need to override an
instinctive response (crystallized intelligence) and styles of thinking conducive to discovering
new perspectives on a problem (open-minded thinking).5 Interestingly, the literature identifies
fluid intelligence (the ability to think logically or algorithmically, as measured by various I.Q.
tests) as having less of a role, because the computational power required to override an impul-
sive response is often only very slight (Stanovich, 2008): what matters is recognizing the need
to override it in the first place. Our results support this hypothesis in the context of sunk costs.
Our paper is the first to validate a scale composed of hypothetical scenarios to measure the
sunk cost effect. The effect is not currently measured by any widely accepted scale. It evades,
e.g., the “Big 5” personality inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1989). As one of the most widely
known behavioral biases, it seems important to have a reliable yet easy to use scale to measure
susceptibility to the effect. To this end, we offer our SCE-8 scale to researchers for any study in
which the sunk cost effect may explain outcomes, reducing or eliminating the need to run a full
experiment. Collecting SCE-8 data would allow susceptibility to the effect to be measured and
used in the same way as other common items including risk tolerance (Blais and Weber, 2006),
patience levels (Brockhoff et al., 2015), and personality measures (Costa and McCrae, 1989).
5A related concept to open-minded thinking is that of mindfulness: Hafenbrack et al. (2014) find that both trait
mindfulness and mindful states induced through meditation increase resistance to the sunk-cost effect.
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3 Design
Our design combines a randomized experiment, a scale composed of hypothetical questions,
and trait measures that have been linked to susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. We organize
and structure our approach around a definition of the sunk cost effect, which we detail now.
3.1 The sunk cost and endowment effects
If an individual has sunk resources positively associated with an alternative, and chooses that
alternative, but would not have chosen it if no such resources were sunk, we define them as
exhibiting the sunk cost effect. More formally, consider a binary choice set {X,Y} and a quantity
of resources r ≥ 0 sunk in ways positively associated with X, where r does not directly affect
the utility garnered from either X or Y , and let Ci({X,Y}; r) be i’s choice function. Under our
definition, i exhibits the sunk cost effect when r > 0, Ci({X,Y}; r) = X, and Ci({X,Y}; 0) = Y .6,7
Within the definition of the sunk cost effect, the term “positively associated” is deliberately
general, to reflect the diverse range of contexts across which the effect applies. A simple exam-
ple may be the money spent on (and hence positively associated with) a theater ticket; a more
complex one may be the various resources sunk into (and hence positively associated with) de-
veloping previous stages of an ongoing project. We are also agnostic about what might count
as a cost and our hypothetical scenarios cover several: effort, time, money, and emotion.
What distinguishes the sunk cost effect from the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990)
is that the former requires some resources to be sunk. In contrast, the latter occurs when an
individual receives an endowment costlessly, deriving value from the very fact they have it.
The sunk cost effect is thereby more nuanced, specifying that the individual must have spent
(sunk) some resources to have the “endowment”. As such, we view the endowment effect as an
essential and necessary part of the sunk cost effect: when an individual exhibits the sunk cost
effect they also exhibit the endowment effect, but the reverse is not necessarily true.
To detect the part of the sunk cost effect net of the endowment effect (and hence the existence
of the sunk cost effect in its own right), we dedicate a treatment group to measuring the latter.
By comparing responses there to those in our primary sunk cost group, we can identify whether
sunk costs have an effect over and above the otherwise standard endowment effect.
6Moreover, if this is true and i believes X yields higher utility we say that i exhibits the sunk cost fallacy, which
is therefore a subset of the effect. Our definitions imply that within mainstream economics, the effect and fallacy
are identical as Ci(X,Y) = X typically implies that i believes Ui(X) > Ui(Y), where Ui is i′s utility function. This
may explain why the two terms are often used interchangeably. Our definitions otherwise serve to label the choice
outcome as the effect and the beliefs supporting that outcome as the fallacy. Others have also drawn distinctions
between the terms but without explicit mention of payoffs or beliefs, e.g., Olivola (2018) remarks that the fallacy
refers to taking an inferior action due to sunk costs whereas the effect refers only to taking a different action.
7A related and older term is the “Concorde effect” (Dawkins and Carlisle, 1976), named after the sustained invest-
ment in the Concorde supersonic jet project, after it was recognized to be an unprofitable venture.
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3.2 Experiment
Subjects. Subjects were recruited via the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online platform,
commonly used throughout the social sciences including economics (e.g., DellaVigna and Pope,
2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015). MTurk’s population has been shown to be more demographically
diverse and to produce data of a comparable quality to some more traditional participant pools
(Chandler et al., 2014; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014), with many studies replicating classic ex-
periments across various domains including cognitive psychology (e.g., Goodman et al., 2013;
Paolacci et al., 2010) and economics (e.g., Horton et al., 2011). The software Qualtrics was
used to perform the experiment. We restricted participation to those in the US, with a good
track record (at least 95% of MTurk jobs approved), at least some experience (successfully
completed at least 50 MTurk jobs), and who had not taken part in any of our pilots.
Pre-trial registration. The experiment was registered in advance in the AEA RCT Registry
(Ronayne et al., 2019). There, we provided an experimental design, power calculations, and
detailed our intention to study: reflective thinking as captured by the Cognitive Reflection Test;
fluid and crystallized intelligence captured by Raven’s progressive matrices and the verbal rea-
soning item of the International Cognitive Ability Resource, respectively; the Openness scale
from the Big Five Personality Inventory; and various demographics. All these measures are
included in our analysis, and no other measures were pre-registered.
Design overview. Our design involved one wave of data collection from 528 subjects.8 Subjects
were randomly allocated to one of three groups such that approximately 60% and 35% fell into
our primary and secondary treatment groups, with 5% in the final group.
In the primary sunk cost group, subjects completed a real-effort task (counting letters in blocks
of text composed of Latin words). If they did well, they earned a lottery (termed an “asset” for
subjects) paying $10 with a 10% chance (else $0), before being given an (unanticipated) choice
to switch to a dominant lottery paying $10 with a 20% chance (else $0). The $1 difference in
expected payoff corresponds to 25% of the subjects’ participation fee, and represents a mean-
ingful amount to the MTurk population, who regularly respond to similar stakes. We detail the
task below, but the essential idea is that the effort, time, etc. exerted to obtain the lottery in the
task form a sunk resource, r > 0, positively associated with it, which, if susceptible to the sunk
cost effect, leads an individual to a different choice (the inferior lottery) to that if they had spent
no such resources (the superior lottery).
In the endowment group, subjects did not complete the real-effort task to earn the asset. Instead,
these subjects were endowed with the inferior (10% chance of $10) lottery before facing the
same (unanticipated) choice to switch to the dominant (20% chance of $10) lottery.
8Calculations suggested this adequate to detect effects with 80% power and 5% significance (Ronayne et al., 2019).
6
The third and final group was run to check that subjects could generally be expected to maximize
their expected pecuniary outcome and understood the wording and descriptions of the lotteries.
Subjects in this condition did not face any real-effort task and were not endowed with anything.
They were simply given a straight choice between the two lotteries.
After their group-specific tasks, all subjects completed a set of psychometric measures. First,
18 hypothetical scenarios (presented in a random order) which they responded to via a 6-point
Likert scale (see Appendix A-C for the numbered list). These scenarios form the basis of the
scale we set out to validate and were drawn from various sources: numbers 1-10 are from the
Health and Retirement Study9; 11-12 are based on Arkes and Blumer (1985); and 13 is based on
Thaler (1980). The final scenarios (14-18) we created to balance the set across different types
of sunk resources . Table 1 describes which scenarios highlight which resources: effort, time,
money, emotion, and a final category belief, shorthand for the resources sunk during the process
of belief formation, which is likely to be a subset of effort.
Table 1: Different types of sunk resources highlighted by the hypothetical scenarios
Resource Scenario ID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Effort 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Money 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Emotion 3 3 3
Belief 3 3 3
The full text of the 18 scenarios is given in the redacted transcript in Appendix A-C. A dark tick indicates the
scenario’s primary focus, while lighter ticks indicate some secondary resources.
Subjects then completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), measures of fluid and crystallized
intelligence, and openness to experience. The CRT measures reflective capacity, i.e., the ability
to think about problems that tend to induce people to fall prey to a behavioral bias (Frederick,
2005). We adopt the extended version of the test (Toplak et al., 2014), which consists of 7
right/wrong questions, giving each subject a score in {0, . . . , 7}.
Fluid intelligence was measured using 10 Raven’s progressive matrices (John and Raven, 2003),
giving scores {0, . . . , 10}. We follow the common practice of assessing crystallized intelligence
by verbal reasoning ability (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) and use the 16-item verbal reason-
ing subset of the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) (Condon and Revelle, 2014),
giving scores {0, . . . , 16}. Potential for open-minded thinking was gauged via the openness to
experience personality trait, which we measured using a 12-item sub-scale from the NEO Five
Factor Inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1989); each item is responded to via a 5-point Likert scale
coded {0, . . . , 4}, giving scores {0, . . . , 48}.
9https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/about
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The measures were incentivized such one of each subject’s answers (across the CRT, ICAR,
and Raven’s tests) was chosen at random, and if correct, $2 was added to their payment. Last,
demographic information was collected. We now outline the sunk cost task in greater detail.
The sunk cost task. Subjects in our primary (sunk cost) group were able to earn a lottery
(termed an “asset” in the experimental instructions) by sinking sufficient resources into a task
of counting letters (similar to that used by Rosaz and Villeval, 2012). Each subject faced a
sequence of five blocks of text. For each block they were asked to count the number of occur-
rences of two different letters under a time limit of 60 seconds (see Figure 1 for a screenshot).
For each letter correctly counted (within a margin of error of one), they got one point. If they
got a total of 6 out of 10 points or more, they earned the inferior lottery paying $10 with a 10%
chance, $0 otherwise. To avoid potential emotional primes from valences of familiar words,
randomly-selected Latin words (from the Lorem Ipsum corpus) were used.
Figure 1: Real-effort task
Subjects in the sunk cost group entered letter counts for five blocks of text. A timer showed the amount
of time remaining (here, 55 seconds). If subjects did not enter a count, their answer was logged as
incorrect. If time expired, the answers present were submitted, and the subject automatically progressed
to the next page. All these points were covered in the instructions. The words were uploaded as an
image file to prevent “CTRL+F” commands from giving the answer. Only integers were accepted.
Pilots revealed substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ ability in the task. With a fixed set of text
for all subjects, we expected to lose a lot of data because many would fail to reach a particular
score out of 10 (and thus not earn a lottery). To increase efficiency, we implemented subject-
specific block paths (unknown to subjects). Specifically, based on their performance on the first
text block, subjects were branched into five routes (very hard, hard, medium, or easy; some were
branched into a very easy route if they also performed poorly in their second block). Tailoring
the task to individual ability levels also has the potential advantage of reducing the variation in
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the amount of resources subjects sunk into the task. In our experiment, 268 of 305 (88%) scored
at least 6/10, made it through to the asset choice, and so can be included in all our analyses.
4 Results
We collected data from 528 subjects over July 22-24, 2019. Average completion time was
27m20s. Subjects received $4.00 for participating, an average hourly wage of $8.78 ($11.21
including incentive payments). Subject demographics are given in Appendix D.
4.1 The sunk cost effect
Table 2 reports the proportion of subjects in the three different treatment groups who chose the
dominated lottery. We first report that 23% (95CI= [18, 28]%) of the 268 subjects in the sunk
cost group who earned the dominated lottery from the real-effort task chose to stick with it,
which we interpret as evidence of behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect.10
In the endowment group, 7% (95CI= [4, 11]%) of the 197 subjects chose the dominated asset.
The difference in the proportion of irrational decisions between the sunk cost and endowment
groups is significantly different from zero (d = 0.16; p < 0.001): the sunk cost effect was
present and not entirely explained by the endowment effect. In fact, in our data the sunk cost
motive appeared to exert a significantly greater influence on decisions than the endowment
motive per se, with the latter accounting for approximately only a third of the overall effect.
Last, we point out that none of the 25 subjects who were presented with a straight choice chose
the dominated alternative. This suggests it is unlikely an individual would choose that asset due
to mathematical deficiency, misunderstanding the text, or some experimental demand effect.
Table 2: Behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect
Condition Choice Pr(dominated)
dominated dominant n
Earned via sunk costs 62 206 268 0.231
Endowment only 14 183 197 0.071
Straight choice 60 225 225 0.000
Difference in proportions 0.160
P-value <0.001
4.2 Drivers of sunk cost behavior
Section 5 first reports that the average marginal effect (AME) of cognitive reflection levels on
the probability of sunk cost behavior is significant (both p < 0.001) and negative: a one standard
deviation increase corresponds to a decrease in the probability of approximately 0.11-0.12.
10A different explanation is that performance, rather than sunk cost, matters. If so, subjects scoring higher would
be more likely to stick with the dominated lottery, but we find a negative correlation (r = −0.16; p = 0.009).
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Table 3: Determinants of susceptibility to the sunk cost effect
Average marginal effects Dependent variable: Behavior






















Observations 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. a Bonferroni-adjusted p < 0.001. Average marginal effects with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from the underlying probit regressions are in Appendix E. Regressors
are standardized. Behavior is a binary variable = 1 if the subject displayed behavior consistent with the sunk
cost effect. Demographics include sex, age, race, household income, education, and conservatism. Of the 268
subjects in the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose not to specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
Guided by the tripartite theory of the mind of Stanovich (2012), we now assess the strength of
inputs of the reflective mind in explaining sunk cost behavior.11 We find crystallized intelligence
to be significant (both p < 0.001), but not fluid intelligence or openness to experience, as
reported in specifications (3) and (4) of Section 5.12 Interpreting the estimated AMEs, a one
standard deviation increase in crystallized intelligence decreases the probability of sunk-cost
behavior by approximately 17-18 percentage points on average13.
Interpretation. Previous work (Stanovich, 2012; Stanovich and West, 2008, discussed in Sec-
tion 2) suggests the key to being able to override a heuristically-primed response is recognizing
the need to override it in the first place (while the capacity required to avoid the bias once
recognized is relatively slight). As such, stocks of knowledge or experience (crystallized in-
telligence) and openness of mind are likely to matter more than computational power (fluid
intelligence). Our results concerning intelligence measures support this hypothesis in the con-
text of sunk costs. A natural interpretation is that a bigger stock of experience is helpful in
enabling individuals to recognize instances of the sunk cost effect and thereby avoid them.
Stanovich and West (2008) also argue conventional measures lack the scope to adequately cap-
ture the types of knowledge required for situations that invoke behavioral biases, but our evi-
11Auxiliary regressions show both fluid and crystallized intelligence are associated with CRT scores (see Appendix
F).
12The two intelligence measures are of course correlated (r = 0.60; p < 0.001) and either measure alone explains
significant variation in sunk cost behavior. However, when both are included in regressions, only crystallized
intelligence retains explanatory power. See Appendix G for the supporting regressions.
13It is plausible the relationship between these cognitive traits and sunk cost behaviour might depend on gender; a
sub-sample analysis in Appendix H reveals however that the results are similar for male and female subjects.
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dence suggests they do not. Contrary to their hypothesis we do not find a relationship between
sunk cost behavior and openness to experience. This could be because that personality trait is
not a major driver of this mode of thinking, because it is not a major driver of the sunk cost
effect, or something particular to our sample; a question for future research.
4.3 SCE-8: A scale to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost effect
We first analyze the latent factor structure of our 528 subjects’ responses to the 18 scenarios to
identify any underlying factors causing them to covary. Informed by that analysis we select the
scenarios to be included in our scale, which we then relate back to behavior.
Exploratory factor analysis. Various checks support the factorability of the data: multi-
collinearity between the 18 items is low (mean variance inflation factor: 1.22); Bartlett’s spheric-
ity test is significant (χ2(153) = 1160.29; p < 0.001); and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy (0.83) surpasses the advised threshold of 0.6 Kaiser and Rice, 1974. Ex-
tracting factors with eigenvalues > 1 (the Kaiser criterion; (Kaiser, 1960)), we find one principal
factor that explains 90% of the variance (with an eigenvalue of 2.81). A scree test (Cattell, 1966)
also supports a one-factor solution, dropping-off substantially after the first factor. Investigating
the fit of that solution, we extract one factor and find that the majority (11 of 18) of scale items
load well onto it (with a loading > 0.32; Costello and Osborne, 2005), as reported in the first
row of Table 4.
Table 4: Factor loadings by scenario ID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
25 18 50 28 24 46 35 39 39 57 49 59 20 43 53 44 30 3
- - 48 - - 48 - - - 56 48 62 - 44 55 50 - -
Loadings are multiplied by 100. The first and second rows report the loadings from the factor analysis
with all 18 and the selected 8 (SCE-8 scale) scenarios, respectively.
We follow recommended practice and drop items with weak loadings (< 0.32). We also drop
items that fail to meet this threshold when excluding subjects (n = 40) who completed the 18
scenarios in less than 90 seconds (items 7 and 8). Finally, we drop item 9 because its loading of
0.34 (after dropping 7 and 8) is marginal and because time (the predominant resource it relates
to) is well represented by several other items with strong loadings. The loadings generated from
the remaining 8 scenarios are given in the second row of Table 4. A reliability analysis of those
items demonstrates internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75).14
Confirmatory factor analysis. To confirm the suitability of a one-factor representation of
these 8 items, we estimate a structural equation model that links subjects’ responses to them
with one latent variable. We find the standardized factor loadings of each of the 8 items to be
14A scale with all 11 items with initial loadings > 0.32 yields a negligibly higher Cronbach’s alpha of 0.749 (cf.
0.747 with 8 items), owing to the fact that the additional three items have notably weaker loadings.
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significant (p < 0.001) and above the recommended value (0.32). Goodness-of-fit measures
are also satisfactory: the standardized root mean squared error is 0.02, falling in the “good” to
“excellent” range (0.01-0.05; MacCallum et al., 1996), while the χ2-to-degrees-of-freedom ratio
is 1.02 (ratios between 1-3 are acceptable, with values closer to 1 indicating a better fit; Bollen
and Scott Long, 1993). We name the 8-scenario scale the “SCE-8”. The scale is provided in
Appendix I, and the corresponding scores of our subjects in Appendix J.
Interpretation. Across the scenarios, different types of costs are sunk to different degrees. We
interpret the emergence of a single factor as the best representation of the data as reflecting both
the idea that the sunk cost effect applies across resources, and the highly interdependent nature
of the resources involved. Moreover, amongst the scenarios with the highest loadings, there is
at least one scenario in which each of the main resources covered is the predominant resource
(see Tables 1 and 4), further suggesting that the factor is relevant for various kinds of sunk cost.
Validating a sunk cost scale with real decisions. Sunk cost behavior and our SCE-8 scale have
a significant pairwise correlation (r = 0.26; p < 0.001). Furthermore, as Table 5 shows, the
scale is significantly associated to cognitive reflection (both p < 0.001), just as our behavioral
measure is (as seen in Section 5). Interpreting the coefficients, a one standard deviation increase
in cognitive reflection is associated with an approximate decrease of 0.4 standard deviations in
susceptibility to the sunk cost effect as measured by the SCE-8. Moreover, unpacking cognitive
reflection into three components, we find that crystallized intelligence is significantly associated
with SCE-8, just as our behavioral measure is. These findings and consistencies lead us to
conclude that the SCE-8 scale is an appropriate substitute for a behavioral measure.
Table 5: Determinants of the SCE-8
Average marginal effects Dependent variable: SCE-8






















Observations 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. a Bonferroni-adjusted p < 0.01. OLS regressions. All variables
are standardized. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Specification testing prompted the inclusion of
squared and interaction terms of the three trait measures in (3)-(4), and so average marginal effects are reported.
Demographics include sex, age, race, household income, education, and conservatism. Of the 268 subjects in
the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose not to specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
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5 Discussion
The sunk cost effect is one of the most well-known biases in decision making. Our work ad-
vances the identification, understanding, and measurement of the effect.
In contrast to existing research, we provide significant evidence of the sunk cost effect through
an incentivized experiment with human subjects. In addition, and to aid our design, we offer
a formal choice-based definition. In our sample, we also showed that the endowment effect,
far from accounting for all of it, is approximately only a third as strong as the sunk cost effect.
This result has implications beyond the detection of these effects: showing that people are more
attached to their resources when they are earnt rather than given helps to explain the observation
that individuals are less inclined to redistribute when they believe that effort plays more of a role
relative to luck in society (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
Second, we find strong evidence that capacity for cognitive reflection is negatively related to
sunk cost behavior: the ability to override one’s instinctive response matters for overcoming
the effect. Moreover, our results support the intuitive hypothesis that one’s stock of knowledge
and experience is predictive of susceptibility to the sunk cost effect, rather than computational
ability. This carries an important and subtle point: we find some measures of intelligence to be
highly correlated with the sunk cost effect and others not. This could explain the mixed results
in the literature and provides a warning: depending upon which measure is used, it is possible
to miss the association between the sunk cost effect and cognitive ability.
Third, we offer a scale – the SCE-8 – for researchers to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost
effect, without needing to conduct an experiment. The SCE-8 covers a range of costs, capturing
the generality of the effect, and appears a good substitute for a behavioral measure. The SCE-8
can be incorporated easily into applied work and can either serve as a measure of interest per
se, or as a control just as other measures have been for decades.
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Other / Prefer not to say 4 (0)








Black or African American 70 (13)
Hispanic or Latino 40 (8)
American Indian or Alaska Native 4 (1)
Asian American 41 (8)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0 (0)
Other 14 (3)
Incomea
0 − 9.999 16 (3)
10 − 19.999 48 (9)
20 − 29.999 79 (15)
30 − 39.999 79 (15)
40 − 49.999 71 (13)
50 − 59.999 63 (12)
60 − 69.999 38 (7)
70 − 79.999 32 (6)
80 − 89.999 19 (4)
90 − 99.999 30 (6)
100 − 124.999 24 (5)
125 − 149.999 14 (3)
150+ 15 (3)
Education
High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 5 (1)
High school graduate (or equivalent) 66 (13)
Some college (1-4 years, no degree) 175 (33)
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, AB, etc) 228 (43)
Master’s degree (MA, MS, MENG, MSW, etc) 47 (9)
Professional school degree (MD, DDC, JD, etc) 5 (1)
Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD, etc) 2 (0)
Political Affiliationb [sd] 36.6 [31.0]
N 528
Frequencies; (% within characteristic); [standard deviation]
a Household annual pre-tax income in ’000 USD
b 0 = “Entirely Liberal”; 100 = “Entirely Conservative”
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Table: Probit coefficients underlying the average marginal effects of Section 5
Dependent variable: Behavior





























































Observations 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. Probit regressions. Regressors are standardized. Behavior is a binary
variable = 1 if the subject displayed behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect. Estimated coefficients shown
with robust standard errors in parentheses. Of the 268 subjects in the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose not to
specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
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Table: Inputs of the reflective mind


















∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. a Bonferroni-adjusted p < 0.001. OLS regres-
sions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressors are standardized. Specification
testing prompted the inclusion of squared, cubed, and interaction terms of the three trait
measures, and so average marginal effects are reported. Demographics include sex, age,
race, household income, education, and conservatism. Of the total 528 subjects, 4 chose
not to specify their sex, leaving 524 for analysis.
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Table: Supporting results to Section 5
























Demos. X X X X
Obs. 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. a Bonferroni-adjusted p < 0.001. Probit regressions. Average marginal
effects with robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressors are standardized. Behavior is a binary variable
= 1 if behavior was consistent with the sunk cost effect. Demographics include sex, age, race, household
income, education, and conservatism. Of the 268 subjects in the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose not to
specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
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Table: Determinants of susceptibility to the sunk cost effect (Male Subjects)
Average marginal effects Dependent variable: Behavior






















Observations 155 155 155 155
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. Average marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressors are standardized. Behavior is a binary variable = 1 if the subject displayed behavior consistent with
the sunk cost effect. Demographics include age, race, household income, education, and conservatism.
Table: Determinants of susceptibility to the sunk cost effect (Female Subjects)
Average marginal effects Dependent variable: Behavior






















Observations 110 110 110 110
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. Average marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressors are standardized. Behavior is a binary variable = 1 if the subject displayed behavior consistent with
the sunk cost effect. Demographics include age, race, household income, education, and conservatism.
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SCE-8: A scale to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost effect
You will be presented with 8 hypothetical scenarios, each of which lead to a choice. For each
one, tell us what you would do. For each item subjects have a 6-point scale for which the two
alternatives are written over the left-most and right-most points. The alternatives are provided
after each scenario below.]
A. You have been looking forward to this year’s Halloween party. You have the right cape, the
right wig, and the right hat. All week, you have been trying to perfect the outfit by cutting out
a large number of tiny stars to glue to the cape and the hat, and you still need to glue them on.
On the day of Halloween, you decide that the outfit looks better without all these stars you have
worked so hard on. [Wear stars; Go without.]
B. You have been asked to give a toast at your friend’s wedding. You have worked for hours on
this one story about you and your friend taking drivers’ education, but you still have some work
to do on it. Then you realize that you could finish writing the speech faster if you start over and
tell the funnier story about the dance lessons you took together. [Finish the toast about driving;
Rewrite the toast about dancing.]
C. You are painting your bedroom with a sponge pattern in your favorite color. It takes a long
time to do. After you finish two of the four walls, you realize you would have preferred the solid
color instead of the sponge pattern. You have enough paint left over to redo the entire room in
the solid color. It would take you the same amount of time as finishing the sponge pattern on
the two walls you have left. [Finish the sponge pattern; Redo the room in a solid color.]
D. You have invested a good deal of your time into a project and it is failing. You have the
option to start on something different that you now know is more likely to be successful but you
know you cannot get the time back that you spent on the project. [Keep going with the project;
Start something different.]
E. You have an investment strategy that you have developed over several months. It is not
working and you are losing money, but there is no way for you to recover the lost effort put into
developing the strategy. [Start afresh; Keep going.]
F. Your relationship with your partner is not going well. You have reasoned it out and you have
realized that if you knew how it would go when you started the relationship you would not have
gone through with it. You now have the opportunity to break up, but you have been together for
many months. [Keep going; Break up.]
G. You have been thinking about how to vote in an election and have invested a good deal
of your time to try and make the right decisions including reading newspapers and comment
pieces online and thinking hard about the issues. You discover that much of the information
you were using is false and a more trustworthy source suggests your initial view was wrong.
[Keep beliefs; Change beliefs.]
H. You have been thinking hard about the best route to get to somewhere you haven’t been to
before. Unfortunately, your internet connection isn’t working so you have to base your decision
on your beliefs about the town’s layout. You come to a conclusion on the best possible route
but then suddenly the internet is back online. [Look up route online; Stick to planned route.]
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0 10 20 30 40
SCE-8 Score (0-40)
Subjects’ scores (n = 528) on the SCE-8 scale. Each scenario is responded to on a 6-point Likert scale and is
coded 0-5 such that the higher the score, the higher the susceptibility, hence the range is 0-40. Summary statistics
for our sample: min 0, max 40, average 9.5, median 8, inter-quartile range [4,15], and standard deviation 7.5.
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A well-known bias in individual decision-making is the tendency to avoid information about po-
tentially negative outcomes, even if it is freely available. Information avoidance can be costly:
an individual’s ability to make good decisions hinges critically on their knowledge of the state of
the world. Previous work suggests that anticipatory emotions (such as worry or regret) play an
important role in information avoidance1. It is therefore plausible that mental training that tar-
gets the regulation of such emotions might help to diminish their influence in decision making.
One such form of mental training is “mindfulness” meditation: a secularised form of Buddhist
meditation, initially developed for pain management (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). It has become in-
creasingly popular in the West in recent decades, and has been linked with various beneficial
effects, e.g. for health, stress, depression and productivity (Brown et al., 2007). The medita-
tion encourages a particular state of mind (non-judgmental attention to the present moment)
and various evidence from psychology and neuroscience has demonstrated that its practice can
increase levels of attention and emotion regulation (and, indeed, structurally change regions of
the brain associated with such tasks2). However, mindfulness can be viewed as a trait as well
as a meditation practice (Brown and Ryan, 2003): different individuals naturally spend more or
less time in such mindful states even if they have never meditated, so its study has implications
for non-meditators as well. Reporting evidence from a Randomised-Controlled Trial (RCT),
this paper will examine whether mindfulness can influence information avoidance.
We designed a trial3 (n = 261) where subjects were randomly allocated to either a treatment
intervention (14 days of 15-minute guided mindfulness meditations), or an active control inter-
vention (14 days of 15-minute guided relaxing-music listening4) which allowed us to test the
effects of mindfulness over-and-above just feeling more relaxed. Utilising a recently-developed
information avoidance scale (Ho et al., 2020), we found that the effect of the mindfulness treat-
ment was to reduce information avoidance (by approximately 0.25 standard deviations) relative
to the control. Additional evidence supports emotion regulation as a plausible mechanism, with
the treatment having a positive effect on a self-report measure of non-reactivity to inner experi-
ence.
We next review the relevant literature and our relative contribution, before detailing the design
and results. We end with a discussion and some concluding remarks.
2 Literature
Our work firstly relates to the literature on the causes of information avoidance. This literature
has documented various potential causes, with Golman et al. (2017) grouping them into hedonic
1See Golman et al. (2017) for a review.
2See Hölzel et al. (2011) for a review.
3Pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry (Ash et al., 2020).
4The same instructor delivered both the treatment and the active control.
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(avoiding information to avoid feeling bad, e.g. because of belief-based utility) and strategic
(as a way to committing to an a priori preferred course of action). However, relatively little is
understood about the psychological and cognitive forces that make different individuals more
or less susceptible to avoiding information. In part this could be because of a lack of a measure
of information avoidance as a psychological construct, which was the motivation for Ho et al.
(2020) to produce the scale we use in this paper. Sweeny et al. (2010) mention some empirical
work that suggests coping styles and uncertainty orientation as two possible explanations for in-
dividual differences in information avoidance; our paper adds to this literature by documenting
the role of mindfulness (which can be viewed as a trait).
We expect mindfulness to act on the hedonic form of information avoidance, where individu-
als avoid information about their beliefs because of psychological costs such as worry, regret,
disappointment, pessimism or cognitive dissonance (Golman et al., 2017). Because the mindful
state of mind encourages individuals to not be wrapped up in thoughts and beliefs as if they were
strictly true (the quality of “non-judgment”), and instead hold them lightly in awareness (a con-
cept known as “meta-awareness”)5, it is possible mindfulness weakens the potential emotional
imprint of beliefs, reducing the influence of worry, regret etc. In support of this, Saunders et al.
(2013) find that mindfulness increases recall of self-threatening information. And, more indi-
rectly, mindfulness has been shown to reduce symptoms of belief-based utility, such as anxiety
(Roemer et al., 2009) and habitual worrying (Verplanken and Fisher, 2014). In general, mindful-
ness has been found to increase abilities to regulate emotions; for example, reducing emotional
interference when performing a task (Ortner et al., 2007) and decreasing emotional reactivity
(Goleman and Schwartz, 1976). Researchers point to people in mindful states being better able
to “reappraise” emotions (Garland et al., 2011) which means they are more equipped to process
uncomfortable emotions, and less likely to engage in experiential avoidance of thoughts, feel-
ings etc. (Kumar et al., 2008). Supporting this work is neuroscientific evidence that shows that
meditators have increased activation in regions of the brain associated with emotion regulation
(Hölzel et al., 2011).
Our paper also relates to a literature that investigates the influence of mindfulness on economic
decision-making. Alem et al. (2016) conduct an RCT which tested whether mindfulness in-
fluenced risk, time preferences and health-related behaviours (e.g. smoking, eating, alcohol
consumption, sleeping), but their results in general were not statistically significant. Moreover,
their active control (watching a historical documentary) does not specifically control for being
relaxed, so it is hard to disentangle the effects of being mindful from being relaxed in their
results (they could go in opposite directions). Noone and Hogan (2018) conduct an RCT to
investigate the effects of mindfulness on various cognitive tasks (that included a heuristics-and-
biases measure). They used the Headspace app to deliver either a mindfulness intervention or
a sham meditation active control and did not find statistically significant effects. The authors
5See Schooler et al. (2011) for a review.
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cannot conclude whether the lack of significance was because of the short treatment not be-
ing effective enough, or whether the sham meditation might have engendered small amounts of
mindfulness (perhaps through an expectation effect). Our study finds instead that it is possible
to influence cognitive biases with only small amounts of mindfulness training. Other papers
contain stronger evidence of mindfulness’s effects on economic decision-making, finding that
mindfulness can make decisions more adaptive (in a gambling context) (Lakey et al., 2007);
reduce negativity bias (Kiken and Shook, 2011); reduce the corespondence bias (Hopthrow
et al., 2017); decrease the sunk cost effect (Hafenbrack et al., 2014); improve addiction and
self-control problems6; and increase levels of altruism (Iwamoto et al., 2020). Our paper adds
information avoidance to these documented effects.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Sample
We recruited 2617 subjects in one wave for the experiment using Prolific, an online crowd-
sourcing platform (based in the UK) which connects researchers to participants for academic
studies. A more commonly used crowdsourcing platform is MTurk. Like MTurk, Prolific has
been found to produce data of a comparable quality to more traditional participant pools (Peer
et al., 2017) and been used to successfully run experiments in economics (e.g. Marreiros et al.,
2017) and psychology (e.g. Callan et al., 2017). However, Prolific has the advantage of par-
ticipants who are more naive with respect to experimental tasks and less dishonest than those
on MTurk (Peer et al., 2017). We also wanted to restrict participation to those in the UK (to
maximise comprehension and familiarity with the instructor’s English accent) and Prolific has
a more active presence there than MTurk. The subjects we recruited were invited to take part
in a study that investigated the effects of mood on decision-making, which involved doing a
simple and enjoyable activity for 15 minutes a day on 14 consecutive days. Each day, the in-
structions for the activity were to be given by a professional instructor via an audio recording.
On the day before and day after the course, the subjects took a survey (which measured our
outcomes). The subjects were paid for doing the activity (£2 per session in the first week; £2.50
per session in the second week) and taking the surveys (£2 for the pre-course survey; £3 for the
post-course survey). Moreover, to minimise attrition, subjects were told on sign-up that their
submissions would only be “accepted” (i.e. they would only be paid) if they completed all parts
of the study (unless there were exceptional circumstances). Various compliance measures are
discussed below.
The software o-Tree was used to host the surveys, while Qualtrics was used to deliver the inter-
ventions. We restricted participation to those in the UK, with a good track record (at least 95%
6See Zgierska et al. (2009) for a review
7Calculations suggested a sample of 220-260 subjects would be adequate to detect effects with 80% power and 5%
significance (Ash et al., 2020).
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of Prolific studies approved), and some previous experience on the platform (completed at least
10 previous studies). We also prescreened on meditation experience, recruting only participants
who had answered “No” to Prolific’s own prescreening question, “Do you meditate?”.
3.2 Inteventions
After the pre-course survey, subjects were randomly allocated to one of two groups: a mindful-
ness intervention (the treatment), and a music intervention (an active control).
Mindfulness intervention. Here the instructor led the participants in a guided mindfulness
meditation each day. Each session started with a short introduction (welcoming the partici-
pants). The instructor then led the participants through three stages of meditation: (1) bringing
awareness to now (noticing what is happening outside and how you are); (2) mindful breath-
ing (being aware of the breath and cultivating an attitude of non-judgment as thoughts arise);
and (3) a body scan (expanding this awareness from the breath to the entire body). This was
then followed by an unled period where the participants were asked to just sit with whatever
awareness they had accumulated, before the instructor came back to end the session.
Music intervention. Here the same instructor led the participants in a period of relaxing music
listening each day. The idea of the intervention was to try to control for as many of the struc-
tural elements of the treatment as possible (15 minutes a day of doing an activity instructed by
an audio recording, with the same instructor leading the activity), and in addition control for
the relaxing effects of the meditations8. To try to make the instructor’s presence felt as much
as in the treatment, the instructor spent time on a short introduction before the music began
(welcoming the participants, mentioning the details of the artist/album etc., and also reciting a
famous quote about music for the participants to contemplate), and after the music finished he
would come back to end the session like in the other group.
In order to boost feelings of instructor-participant interaction for both groups (and help min-
imise attrition), the instructor prepared three short videos of himself to be played at the start,
middle and end of the interventions (simple check-ins). In addition, participants were sent
daily reminders on Prolific about the activity sessions. Compliance was encouraged before the
recordings began with a request to close all sources of distraction and to stay on the browser tab
(and not multitask). Compliance was then monitored by different measures: (1) how often they
left their browser tab during the recording; (2) whether they clicked to the “next page” when
the instructor asked them to at the end of the recording. We also included an optional feedback
question about their experience of the session at the end.
8Various studies document the salutary effects of music for stress (see de Witte et al. (2020) for an overview.). In
some contexts music has been found to have comparable effects to meditation in reducing stress (e.g. Innes et al.,
2016), and has previously been used as part of an active control for the widely-used Mindfulness-Based Stress
Reduction (MBSR) programme (MacCoon et al., 2012). Stress impacts cognitive processes (e.g. “System 1” and
“System 2” thinking (Kahneman, 2011)) that underlie various kinds of decisions (including information avoidance)
so is important to control for if possible.
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3.3 Procedure
The study was launched on Thursday the 27th of August, 2020. On the first day we recruited
261 subjects, who signed up and completed the pre-course survey. Then from the 28th of August
through to the 11th of September, each day the subjects were invited to complete a session of
the daily activity (study available from 6am; reminder sent at 3pm), and were asked to submit
by 3am the following day. Participants who missed a session were asked to do the session on
the following day instead. Participants who attempted a session but had difficulties finishing it
for some reason (e.g. because of internet trouble, etc.) were allowed to miss the session. Any
participant who missed more than one session without giving a reason was excluded. On the
12th of September, they were invited to do the post-course survey.
3.4 Outcomes
Information avoidance. We used the Information Preference Scale (IPS) (Ho et al., 2020): a
13-item scale (validated by an incentivised experiment) that measures an individual’s willing-
ness to receive information that might cause worry or regret in a series of thirteen hypothetical
scenarios9. Items are responded to on a 4-point scale coded {0, . . . , 3}, giving scores {0, . . . , 39}.
Due to the transparent nature of the questions, information preferences were measured in the
post-course survey only.
Mindfulness. We used the 15-item version of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ)
(Baer et al., 2012), a frequently-used measure of mindfulness and its underlying dimensions
(Sauer et al., 2013). Items are responded to on a 5-point scale coded {0, . . . , 4}, giving a mind-
fulness score of {0, . . . , 60}, but the scale can also be disaggregated into subscales that measure
five attributes of mindfulness: observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judging of in-
ner experience and non-reactivity to inner experience (3 items in each, scores {0, . . . , 12}). Due
to its transparency, this outcome was also measured in the post-course survey only.
Stress. We used the 10-item version of the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) (Cohen and Williamson,
1988), a widely-used instrument to assess subjective perceptions of stress (Liu et al., 2020).
Items are responded to on a 5-point scale coded {0, . . . , 4}, giving scores {0, . . . , 40}.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
To measure the effect of the treatment on information avoidance (measured in the post-course
survey only) we ran the following OLS regression:
Yi = α + βTreati + γXi + εi (1)
Where Yi is the outcome, Treati is a dummy variable equal to 1 for individuals in the mindfulness
treatment, and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics measured at baseline.




Table 1 shows the sample characteristics for a set of baseline measures. The randomisation
appears to be well balanced, with no significant differences in the means of these observable
characteristics between the treatment and control groups prior to the interventions.
Table 1: Baseline Characteristics
Variables All Treatment Control Diff
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean
Agea 43.81 12.61 43.81 11.73 43.81 13.47 0.00
Female 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.00
White 0.93 0.25 0.92 0.27 0.94 0.24 -0.01
Degree 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.49 -0.05
Household income (1-10) 4.63 2.30 4.77 2.31 4.49 2.29 0.28
Conservatism (0-100) 44.17 22.07 45.57 22.52 42.75 21.60 2.82
Perceived stress (0-40) 17.84 3.99 17.78 4.05 17.90 3.94 -0.12
Observations 261 131 130
Notes: None of the differences in mean were significant at the 10% level. “Degree” is
whether they have a Bachelor’s degree. “Household income” bracket i is (i-1)*£10,000
to i*£10,000 (pre-tax). “Conservatism” is liberal-conservative scale. aTwo participants
in the treatment group did not give their age, so the number of observations on age in the
full sample / treatment was 259 / 129.
4.2 Attrition
Levels of attrition were 13% in the treatment and 18% in the control, and mostly occurred after
the pre-course survey (see Figure 1).




















































































In Table 2 we check whether the treatment and control groups are still comparable in the sample
of non-attritors. Examining the baseline characteristics, we find no evidence for asymmetric
attrition, with no significant differences in the means of the treatment and control.























Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. No differences were significant at the 10% level.
4.3 Compliance and Feedback
Participant feedback during the treatment and control interventions was generally positive. Af-
ter each session participants were asked, “Are you happy with how today’s session went?”,
responding on a 5-point scale: not at all (1); a little (2); moderately (3); very much (4); ex-
tremely (5). The average feedback per session was 3.92 in the control and 3.75 in the treatment
(see Appendix D for the distributions).
We now evaluate levels of compliance. Our first measure is how often participants switched
away from the browser tab with the recording during the interventions. Figure 2 plots the
distribution over participants of their average switches per session. The treatment and control
groups are fairly similar, with significant proportions focusing during the recordings (over 40%
have an average number of switches between 0 and 1). The difference in the mean of the control
(1.61) and the treatment (1.72) is not statistically significant (t = 0.680; p = 0.497).
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Notes: This figure shows the distributions over participants of the average number of browser tab
switches per session during the interventions. The bins are of width 1.
We also measured compliance by seeing whether they clicked to the “next page” when the in-
structor asked them to at the end of the recording (which gauges if they had been listening). In
Figure 3 we show the distribution over participants of the average difference between their sub-
mission times and the end of the recording per session. Again the treatment and control group
distributions look similar, with a substantial proportion of participants (over 40%) seeming to
submit more or less when they are told (within 30 seconds of the end of the recording). The
interval with the second-highest density for both groups is between 0 and minus 30 seconds:
the next button appears 30 seconds before the end so this could reflect participants clicking as
soon as possible for some sessions; however, it is also true the instructor tended to wrap up
the sessions in a similar way across the recordings so participants could just be skipping his
final remarks because they are used to them. The difference in the mean of the treatment (58
seconds) and control (36 seconds) is again not statistically significant10 (t = 1.464; p = 0.145).
10The means of the treatment and control are significantly influenced by outliers: removing the largest 4 observa-
tions decreases the mean of the treatment to 39.7 seconds and the mean of the control to 17.3 seconds.
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Difference in Submission Time (s)
Notes: This figure shows the distributions over participants of their average difference in submis-
sion time per session (from the true end of the recording). The bins have a width of 30 seconds.
4.4 Levels of Stress and Mindfulness
Both interventions reduce the point estimates of perceived stress, although the effects are not
significant (see Figure 4).









































Notes: This figure shows the pre-course and post-course means of perceived
stress in the treatment and control. Gray bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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It is unclear why the treatment and active control did not have significant effects on reducing
stress. It could be that the length of the interventions and amount of practice per day were
insufficient to generate significant reductions, or perhaps the perceived stress scale was too noisy
a measure to have detected a change with the current sample. In any case, the active control has
fulfilled its primary purpose: to provide the equivalent effect on stress as the treatment.
We also collected data on mindfulness using the FFMQ scale. In Figure 5 we can see that the
mean of the non-reacting subscale is significantly higher in the treatment than in the control
(t = 2.059; p = 0.04). For the other facets and overall FFMQ the treatment raises the point
estimates of the means slightly compared to the control, but the effects are not significant. The
evidence suggests that the skill of non-reacting developed strongly as a result of the programme
of meditations designed by the instructor.


































































Sum of Five Facets
Control Treatment
Notes: This figure compares the post-course means of the FFMQ scale and
sub-scales. Gray bars show 95% confidence intervals.
4.5 Mindfulness and Information Acquisition
We now evaluate the effect of the treatment on information avoidance. As seen in Table 3, being
assigned to the treatment has a significant positive effect on preferences to receive potentially
negative information as measured by the IPS. Interpreting the coefficients, being in the treat-
ment is associated with an increase of approximately 0.25 standard deviations in information
preferences.
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Table 3: Effect of the Treatment on Information Preferences









∗p < 0.10. Marginal effects from OLS regressions with robust standard errors in paren-
theses. IPS is standardised. Demographics include sex, age, race, education, household
income and conservatism.
4.5.1 Emotion Regulation as a Potential Mechanism
As noted previously, participants in the treatment group scored significantly lower on the non-
react scale of the FFMQ in the post-course survey. Figure 6 shows the three items from that
scale.
Figure 6: Non-React Scale Items from the FFMQ
“When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and
am aware of the thought or image without getting taken over by
it.”
“When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just
to notice them without reacting.”
“When I have distressing thoughts or images I just notice
them and let them go.”
The items suggest that the mindfulness training in the treatment cultivated a potential to not
react to distressing inner experience. This inner experience could include anticipatory emotions
such as worry or regret, so regulation of anticipatory emotions seems like a viable mechanism
by which the mindfulness training was able to reduce tendencies for information avoidance.
In Table 4 we show that the treatment had a significant effect on the non-react scale when
incorporating demographic controls and robust standard errors. Interpreting the coefficients,
being in the treatment group is associated with an increase of approximately 0.27 standard
deviations in the non-react scale.
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Table 4: Effect of the Treatment on Non-Reacting









∗∗p < 0.05. Marginal effects from OLS regressions with robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Non-React Scale is standardised. Demographics include sex, age, race, educa-
tion, household income and conservatism.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have provided evidence on mindfulness as a cause of differences between in-
dividuals in their susceptibility to information avoidance. The costs of information avoidance
for individuals, companies and society at large are potentially substantial (from individuals un-
willing to learn about their health (including whether or not they carry infectious diseases), to
investors holding off looking at their stocks’ performance (Ho et al., 2020)) so understanding
what might drive some individuals to avoid information more than others is important. Our ev-
idence suggests that people in the population who spend more of their time inhabiting mindful
states are better able to look at potentially negative, but nonetheless useful, information about
themselves and the world. Supplementary evidence suggests at mindfulness’s effects on emo-
tion regulation (specifically, non-reaction to emotions) as a potential mechanism through which
this greater tolerance for information operates.
An important concern about the trial is whether subjects in the treatment group actually engaged
with the guided meditations. The compliance measures were encouraging in this regard in that
it appeared that significant proportions of the subjects were listening to the recordings (e.g. not
switching off the browser tab, and clicking to the next page when the instructor asked them to
at the end of the recording). However, it could be that the subjects listened to the recordings but
did not practice the meditations. Although this is hard to rule out, it seems difficult to square
with the evidence, which showed that subjects in the treatment group developed higher levels
of non-reaction, a known effect of meditation. An additional concern is that subjects in the
treatment group, once they knew that meditation was their daily activity, would have certain
expectations about the effects of meditation, and this would then influence their responses on
the information avoidance measure (an “experimenter demand” effect). Given that information
avoidance is an unknown effect of meditation (not discussed in the public domain), and that
no relevant cues were given during the interventions in relation to information avoidance, we
are less concerned about experimenter demand in relation to this outcome. Nonetheless, we
controlled the expectations that could be managed in the design as best as possible, with both
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the treatment and control groups being told the same message in regards to their activity at the
start of the interventions: that it had been found to have a “positive effect on people’s mood and
wellbeing”.
Our paper therefore adds information avoidance to the growing list of found benefits of mind-
fulness. This result potentially has strong policy implications. “Nudging” (Thaler and Sun-
stein, 2009) has become a staple of behavioural policy, being employed in various governments
throughout the world. However, by shaping individual choices without their knowledge, it has
been criticised as a potential threat to individual autonomy11. Making better decisions through
greater levels of mindfulness, on the other hand, is a fully conscious process, so mindfulness
training could provide governments with a more ethical approach to ameliorating cognitive bi-
ases. Our evidence shows that mindfulness is able to reduce information avoidance, but more
work is needed to test its effects on a wider array of cognitive biases; for example, mindful-
ness (by managing the emotions triggered by beliefs) might also affect the processes underlying
“motivated beliefs (such as wishful thinking)12. We hope our investigation will encourage more
research in this area.
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— APPENDIX A —
Information Preference Scale
In each scenario below, you will have an opportunity to receive information. This information may or
may not be useful and it may or may not be painful to learn. Please read each scenario carefully, then
indicate if you want to know that information. [Choices: Definitely don’t want to know; Probably don’t
want to know; Probably want to know; Definitely want to know. “R” is scored in reverse.]
1) As part of a semiannual medical checkup, your doctor asks you a series of questions. The answers to
these questions can be used to estimate your life expectancy (the age you are predicted to live to). Do
you want to know how long you can expect to live?
2) You provide some genetic material to a testing service to learn more about your ancestors. You are
then told that the same test can, at no additional cost, tell you whether you have an elevated risk of
developing Alzheimer’s. Do you want to know whether you have a high risk of developing Alzheimer’s?
3) At your annual checkup, you are given the option to see the results of a diagnostic test, which can
identify, among other things, the extent to which your body has suffered long-term effects from stress.
Do you want to know how much lasting damage your body has suffered from stress?
4) Ten years ago, you had the opportunity to invest in two retirement funds: Fund A and Fund B. For the
past 10 years, you have invested all your retirement savings in Fund A. Do you want to know the balance
you would have if you had invested in Fund B instead?
5) You decide to go to the theater for your birthday and give your close friend (or partner) your credit
card so they can purchase tickets for the two of you, which they do. You aren’t sure but suspect that the
tickets may have been expensive. Do you want to know how much the tickets cost?
6) You bought an electronic appliance at a store at what seemed like a reasonable,though not particularly
low, price. A month has passed, and the item is no longer returnable. You see the same appliance
displayed in another store with a sign announcing “SALE.” Do you want to know the price you could
have bought it for?
7) You gave a close friend one of your favorite books for her birthday. Visiting her apartment a couple of
months later, you notice the book on her shelf. She never said anything about it; do you want to know if
she liked the book?
8) Someone has described you as quirky, which could be interpreted in a positive or negative sense. Do
you want to know which interpretation he intended?
9) You gave a toast at your best friend’s wedding. Your friend says you did a good job, but you arnt sure
if he or she meant it. Later, you overhear people discussing the toasts. Do you want to know what people
really thought of your toast?
10) As part of a fundraising event, you agree to post a picture of yourself and have people guess your
age (the closer they get, the more they win). At the end of the event, you have the option to see people’s
guesses. Do you want to learn how old people guessed that you are?
11) You have just participated in a psychological study in which all of the participants rate others’ attrac-
tiveness. The experimenter gives you an option to see the results for how people rated you. Do you want
to know how attractive other people think you are?
12) Some people seek out information even when it might be painful. Others avoid getting information
that they suspect might be painful, even if it could be useful.How would you describe yourself?
13) If people know bad things about my life that I don’t know, I would prefer not to be told. [R]
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Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire
Please indicate how true the below statements are of you using the scale provided. [Choices: Never or
very rarely true; Rarely true; Sometimes true; Often true; Very often or always true. “R” is scored in
reverse. Observing items: 1, 6, 11. Describing items: 2, 7, 12. Acting with awareness items: 3, 8, 13.
Non-judging items: 4, 9, 14. Non-reacting items: 5, 10, 15.]
1) When I take a shower or a bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my body.
2) I’m good at finding words to describe my feelings.
3) I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or otherwise
distracted. [R]
4) I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that way. [R]
5) When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware of the thought or image
without getting taken over by it.
6) I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and emotions.
7) I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things. [R]
8) I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing. [R]
9) I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel them. [R]
10) When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them without reacting.
11) I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face.
12) Even when I’m feeling terribly upset I can find a way to put it into words.
13) I find myself doing things without paying attention. [R]
14) I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling. [R]
15) When I have distressing thoughts or images I just notice them and let them go.
46
— APPENDIX C —
Perceived Stress Scale
The questions below ask about your feelings and thoughts during the last week. For each question, you
will be asked to indicate how often you felt or thought a certain way. Although some of the questions
are similar, there are differences between them and you should treat each one as a separate question. The
best approach is to answer each question fairly quickly. That is, don’t try to count up the number of
times you felt a particular way, but rather indicate the alternative that seems like a reasonable estimate.
[Choices: Never; Almost never; Sometimes; Fairly often; Very often. “R” is scored in reverse.]
1) In the last week, how often have you been upset because of something that happened unexpectedly?
2) In the last week, how often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your
life?
3) In the last week, how often have you felt nervous and stressed?
4) In the last week, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal prob-
lems? [R]
5) In the last week, how often have you felt that things were going your way? [R]
6) In the last week, how often have you found that you could not cope with all the things that you had to
do?
7) In the last week, how often have you been able to control irritations in your life? [R]
8) In the last week, how often have you felt that you were on top of things? [R]
9) In the last week, how often have you been angered because of things that happened that were outside
of your control?
10) In the last week, how often have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that you could not
overcome them?
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Notes: This figure shows the distributions over participants of their average session evaluation during
the interventions. The bins are of width 1.
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1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental human concerns, happiness, has also become a key focus of
policymakers, who have recognised its positive effects for health and productivity as well as
individual quality of life. Measuring happiness at the macro level is therefore an important
area of research, with the most popular method in recent decades being surveys of subjective
wellbeing. Recently, in response to historical gaps in such survey data, a new measure was de-
veloped which utilised the psychological valence of the words in books (Hills et al., 2019). Like
language, music can also encode emotional information: it has been described as a “language
of the emotions” (Cooke, 1959), with studies demonstrating that different people can recognise
the same patterns of emotion in a song (Juslin, 2013). Moreover, it is the emotional experience
that music offers that primarily motivates individuals to listen to it (Juslin and Laukka, 2004).
This paper demonstrates that the valence of a country’s most popular songs (extracted using
techniques from music information retrieval) can also be used to measure national happiness
and can be more robust than a text-based measure.
Our focus for this study is the UK, for which we constructed a Music Valence Index (MVI) using
the valence of the most popular song of each year since the 1970s (according to the official music
charts). This valence was predicted by a machine learning model (Support Vector Regression)
that had been trained to learn audio features associated with high/low valence according to a
separate set of songs that had been annotated by human subjects (Soleymani et al., 2013). We
find that the MVI displays a significant degree of similarity with the survey-based measure of
life satisfaction. First, the MVI appears to mirror key aspects in life satisfaction’s variation over
time. Second, the two have a significant pairwise correlation, which persists after controlling
for GDP, the effect of time and a battery of other controls. Finally, in a horse race between the
MVI and the Text Valence Index (TVI) of Hills et al. (2019), the MVI emerges as a stronger
predictor of life satisfaction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 wraps up and offers some final
thoughts.
2 Literature
First, our paper relates to the literature in economics that tries to measure happiness. Many
papers have discussed the validity of self-reports of subjective wellbeing as a measure, which
on the whole are fairly reliable (Diener et al., 2018). Mentioned already is the paper of Hills
et al. (2019), whose TVI measure (based on the valence of words in books) is discussed in more
detail and compared with the MVI below. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to
use measured emotions in music to make any sort of inference about national mood (including
happiness).
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Second, our work also relates to a literature on the relationship between music and emotions.
The fact that over a hundred studies report that different listeners can hear the same emotions
in a song illustrates music’s potential to express emotions (Juslin, 2013). It therefore stands to
reason that listeners might choose songs based on their emotional content to help them work
through their own emotions. Indeed, previous work shows how music is used to assist with the
emotional processing of significant events, to heighten or strengthen the emotional significance
of an activity or ritual, and to manage mood (Sloboda and Juslin, 2010). Our results add to this
evidence base by showing that the emotions in the most popular songs reflect how people are
actually feeling in the population. The psychology of music literature distinguishes between
perceived and induced emotions, and it is important to emphasise that the MVI relates only to
perceived emotions; however, this makes it consistent with the notion of music, like a language,
being able to describe an emotion to the listener. Whether or not the music has an emotional
impact on the listener is therefore not gauged by the MVI (and of course we make no claim
that popular music is actually affecting national happiness), but our results (and our success
in developing a measure of national valence) support the idea that the emotional content of
popular music reflects the expressed emotions of listeners. We remain agnostic as to the cause,
but one idea could be that people are more likely to buy a record if it is in tune with how they
are feeling, which would imply that the most popular record is then the one that is best able
to capture the public mood; this is at least consistent with additional evidence (presented in
Appendix A) which demonstrates that the chart topping song is better able to capture national
happiness than tracks further down the charts that are less popular. Note, such a process could
be further facilitated by record labels, who would be motivated to promote tracks and artists
that tap the public mood if such a strategy is favourable to selling records (indeed, Hills et al.
(2019) suggest a similar mechanism for the TVI in relation to publishing houses and books).
Finally, our paper relates to the data science literature on music emotion recognition, a branch of
music information retrieval (Kim et al., 2010). We provide a new application of these methods:




We identified the most popular song of the year in the UK using the official singles chart (www.
officialcharts.com), which is based on record sales. Only weekly charts are available
before 2005 so we applied the following transformation to determine annual scores. Let xi be a
track’s chart position in a given week (1st, 2nd, etc.) and y be the lowest possible position on the




i=1(y + 1 − xi), with the highest-scoring then selected as the most popular. Note,
it could be the case that people buy more music during certain weeks of the year (e.g. around
Christmas time), so the track we identify as most popular might not have actually obtained the
most record sales during the year; rather, the score picks up songs which had lasting popularity
over the whole year. The most popular songs were then purchased from Amazon Music or the
Apple iTunes Store depending upon availability (the song list is available in Appendix B, along
with each song’s predicted valence).
3.1.2 Valence Prediction
To predict the valence scores of each song we trained a machine learning model to learn au-
dio features that best predicted valence using a separate set of tracks that had been anno-
tated by human subjects. The annotated dataset comes from Soleymani et al. (2013) (http:
//cvml.unige.ch/databases/emoMusic/). It consists of 45-second clips of 744 songs from
the Free Music Archive (https://freemusicarchive.org/) that span a variety of popular
genres (blues, electronic, rock, classical, folk, jazz, country, pop). Each clip was annotated by
a minimum of 10 participants on a 9-point valence scale, the average of which is our target
measure. We computed our own audio features (191 in total) using the 45-second clips (details
are provided in Appendix C). Because the valence target exists on an approximately continu-
ous scale (after averaging across participants), we use a regression framework for prediction.
Specifically, we use a Support Vector Regression (SVR) which has displayed relatively good
performance for predicting valence in comparison to other regression methods (Yang et al.,
2008).
To arrive at our predictive model, we first used a 5-fold cross validation procedure to optimise
the SVR algorithm’s parameters and the number of features (using R2 to assess performance
on the validation sets). We then trained a model using a fraction (619 ≈ 83%) of the annotated
songs and tested its performance on the remaining 125 songs to see how well it might generalise;
we were able to achieve a reasonably high R2 on the test set in comparison to machine learning
methods from other papers (0.33). Note that we used the same train-test split as in Soleymani
et al. (2013) so we could benchmark the model’s performance. Finally, we re-trained the model
on the full sample of 744 annotated songs and used it to predict the valence scores of the UK’s
most popular songs (using 45-second clips extracted from the middle of each song as input
data), which generates what we call the MVI.
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3.2 Other Happiness Measures
3.2.1 Life Satisfaction
To validate the MVI, we use Eurobarometer life satisfaction data (the average per year of all
individuals surveyed). This is the longest-running measure of subjective wellbeing (available
since 1973), and is also the one used to validate the TVI in Hills et al. (2019). The question
asked is, “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all
satisfied with the life you lead?”, with responses given on a 4-point Likert scale.
3.2.2 Text Valence
The TVI measure from Hills et al. (2019) was constructed using the Google Books corpus
(Lin et al., 2012). They derived annual valence scores for the UK using the average valence
of words in books published in Great Britain during a particular year (weighted by their word
frequencies). The valence norms used were for 14,000 English words (each an average of
valence ratings by 20 participants on a 9-point scale (Warriner et al., 2013)).
3.3 Controls
Incorporated in the analyses below are traditional controls used in the subjective wellbeing lit-
erature. Firstly, our measure of GDP is from the Penn dataset (in 2005 international dollars,
adjusted for purchasing power parity). We also use a set of measures from the OECD: life
expectancy at birth (as a measure of health); education inequality (measured as a GINI index);
total gross central government debt as a percentage of GDP (as a measure of public expendi-
ture); and inflation.
4 Results
4.1 Time Series of Life Satisfaction, MVI and TVI
As seen in Figure 1, the MVI displays a high degree of similarity with life satisfaction over
time, mirroring key elements in its variation. For example, local peaks in life satisfaction in
1980 and 1989 are picked up by the MVI, which also appears to match well the frequency of
the life satisfaction data. The TVI on the other hand does less well at picking up such peaks,
with its frequency resembling that of a smoothed series. These “eyeballing” observations are
confirmed by formal statistical analysis, to which we will now turn.
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4.2 Correlation of Life Satisfaction and MVI
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of life satisfaction and the MVI. As can be seen, they display a
significant positive correlation (r = 0.39; p = 0.02).
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The analysis in Table 1 then shows that this positive relationship between MVI and life satis-
faction is robust to the introduction of GDP, a time trend and various other controls (p = 0.003
without the additional controls; p = 0.008 with them). In all regression analyses we report
(White) standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity, but there are no substantive differ-
ences in the results with regular standard errors.
Table 1: The MVI Predicts Life Satisfaction













Other controls No Yes
Observations 34 34
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. Marginal effects with robust (White) standard errors
in parentheses. Life satisfaction and MVI are standardised; GDP is the logarithm of
gross domestic product per capita. Other controls include life expectancy, education
inequality, public debt and inflation.
4.3 Comparing the MVI and TVI
As shown in Table 2, when included in the same regression, the MVI emerges as a stronger pre-
dictor of life satisfaction than the TVI for the UK, with only its coefficient remaining significant.
This holds true whether the full set of controls (life expectancy, education inequality, public debt
and inflation) are included or not (p = 0.004 without the additional controls; p = 0.007 with
them).
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Table 2: MVI a Stronger Predictor of Life Satisfaction than the TVI


















Other controls No Yes
Observations 34 34
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. Marginal effects with robust (White) standard errors
in parentheses. Life satisfaction, MVI and TVI are standardised; GDP is the logarithm
of gross domestic product per capita. Other controls include life expectancy, education
inequality, public debt and inflation.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have provided evidence that the valence of a country’s most popular songs
can provide a reliable indication of average happiness in the population. Moreover, for the UK
at least, it appears that the valence of popular music provides a more accurate depiction of its
happiness than the valence of books, which supports the idea of music as a specialised “language
of the emotions” (Cooke, 1959). A nice feature of the measure is that it only requires collecting
information on one song each year (the most popular), which makes it relatively cheap and easy
to implement. We support this further in Appendix A where we show that using the valences of
tracks that are less popular (including an average of the top 10 songs) does not work as well as
focusing only on chart-topping songs.
Here we have only shown that music can predict happiness within a country. Future research
might wish to consider the potential of music to explain between-country differences in hap-
piness. Music has the potential to be a good between-country predictor since it is not only an
emotional language, but a “universal” one (Longfellow, 1835) and is found in every society
with a stable set of functions (Mehr et al., 2019). In general, we hope to encourage a closer look
at the emotions in music as potentially representative of underlying social and cultural patterns.
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— APPENDIX A —
Table: The Most Popular Song is the Best Measure of Life Satisfaction
Correlations (p) Life Satisfaction
Valence of #1 Song (MVI) 0.386
∗∗
(0.024)
Valence of #2 Song
0.128
(0.471)
Valence of #3 Song
0.235
(0.180)
Valence of #4 Song 0.344
∗
(0.054)
Valence of #5 Song
-0.161
(0.364)
Valence of #6 Song
0.022
(0.902)
Valence of #7 Song
0.017
(0.924)
Valence of #8 Song
-0.157
(0.375)
Valence of #9 Song 0.308
∗
(0.077)
Valence of #10 Song
0.017
(0.924)
Average Valence of #1-#10 Songs 0.307
∗
(0.077)
Pairwise correlations with p-values in parentheses. Statistically significant measures
presented in bold: ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
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Table: Most Popular Songs of the Year and their Predicted Valences (which form the MVI)
Year Title Artist Valence (1-9)
1973 Tie a Yellow Ribbon Round the Ole Oak Tree Dawn featuring Tony Orlando 4.99
1974 The Wombling Song The Wombles 5.40
1975 Bye Bye Baby Bay City Rollers 5.74
1976 Mississippi Pussycat 5.01
1977 Evergreen Barbra Streisand 4.08
1978 Rivers of Babylon Boney M. 5.82
1979 Bright Eyes Art Garfunkel 3.94
1980 Feels Like I’m in Love Kelly Marie 6.47
1981 Birdie Song The Tweets 5.54
1982 Come On Eileen Dexy’s Midnight Runners 5.81
1983 Blue Monday New Order 5.78
1984 Relax Frankie Goes To Hollywood 5.25
1985 The Power of Love Jennifer Rush 4.90
1986 So Macho Sinitta 5.51
1987 Never Gonna Give You Up Rick Astley 5.16
1988 Push It Salt-N-Pepa 5.98
1989 Ride on Time Black Box 6.06
1990 Killer Adamski 5.73
1991 (Everything I Do) I Do It for You Bryan Adams 4.73
1992 Rhythm Is a Dancer Snap! 6.10
1993 No Limit 2 Unlimited 5.11
1994 Love Is All Around Wet Wet Wet 4.59
1995 Think Twice Celine Dion 5.22
1996 Return of the Mack Mark Morrison 5.98
1997 I’ll Be Missing You Puff Daddy & Faith Evans 5.77
1998 How Do I Live LeAnn Rimes 4.83
1999 Heartbeat Steps 5.69
2000 Amazed Lonestar 4.84
2001 Whole Again Atomic Kitten 5.01
2002 How You Remind Me Nickelback 4.76
2003 In Da Club 50 Cent 5.51
2004 Left Outside Alone Anastacia 5.33
2005 You’re Beautiful James Blunt 4.94
2006 Hips Don’t Lie Shakira featuring Wyclef Jean 5.89
2007 How to Save a Life The Fray 5.39
2008 Rockstar Nickelback 5.64
2009 Poker Face Lady Gaga 6.01
2010 Empire State of Mind Alicia Keys 4.45
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Valence Prediction
We extracted commonly used acoustic features for music emotion recognition (Kim et al., 2010)




• Spectral Contrast - 7 bands
• Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCC) - 24 coefficients
• Zero Crossing Rate
• Chroma Energy Normalized Statistics (CENS) - 12 chroma
• Beat Per Minute (BPM)
• Root Mean Square (RMS)
• Spectral Flux
• Onset Rate
• High Frequency Content (HFC)
All features were extracted at the frame level except for BPM, RMS, spectral flux, onset rate
and HFC. For frame-level features, we used Hann windows of 46 ms, and computed the mean
and variance of the frame values and first-order differences. In total there were 191 features.
We then trained a Support Vector Regression (SVR) on the annotated Free Music Archive
dataset using radial basis functions as kernels. Features were preprocessed with z-score nor-
malisation (removing the mean and scaling to unit variance) so features with large magnitude
would not dominate the objective function. A 5-fold cross-validation procedure selected the
optimal parameters of the SVR algorithm and number of features (100). Feature selection was
carried out using the F-test which tests the individual effect of each feature by converting the
correlation between each feature and the valence to an F score. Using the same train-test split









a Soleymani et al. (2013). b Choi et al. (2017). c Soleymani et al. (2014).
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